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Abstract 
This article investigates the little-known plans formulated by Harold Wilson’s Labour 
government to deploy Polaris submarines in the Indo-Pacific region. The scheme was 
first proposed in 1965 as a response to several problems faced by British policymakers, 
including China’s acquisition of a nuclear capability, Britain’s wish to maintain a 
meaningful position ‘East of Suez’ at reduced cost, and German pressure for equal 
treatment within NATO on nuclear matters.  Despite extensive high-level discussion, the 
plans were finally abandoned in mid-1968, as Labour moved more decisively to forsake 
the world role. 
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Polaris, East of Suez: British plans for a Nuclear Force in the Indo-Pacific, 1964-68. 
 
Matthew Jones and John W. Young 
 
The late 1960s were a time of retreat for Britain on the world stage.  Balance of payments 
crises forced successive cuts in overseas expenditure on a beleaguered Labour 
government, and large-scale withdrawal from military bases ‘East of Suez’ was finally 
announced in July 1967. British weakness was further exposed by the humiliating 
devaluation of sterling four months later, and in January 1968 the timetable for the pull-
back of forces from Malaysia, Singapore and the Persian Gulf was accelerated.  By 1970 
Britain seemed set on a future in the European Community, its defence efforts focused on 
NATO.  Yet this retreat, however inevitable it seems in retrospect, was not achieved 
without a great deal of uncertainty. Some imperial problems, such as the efforts to 
establish Malaysia and settle the future of Rhodesia, were not easily resolved.  While the 
Vietnam War raged, the United States and the Commonwealth countries of Australia, 
New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore did not relish the thought of a rapid British 
withdrawal from South East Asia.  Moreover, British leaders, for whom the world role 
was often synonymous with national greatness, were unsure about the speed and pattern 
of their departure from long-held commitments. One little-studied aspect of the debate 
over how Britain could still project power in the Indo-Pacific region was over plans for 
the deployment of Polaris submarines once they became available in 1968. In retrospect 
this seems an outlandish scheme, informed more by Wilson’s much-derided assertion that 
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Britain’s frontiers lay on the Himalayas rather than by a rational approach to apportioning 
scarce resources. Certainly the Prime Minister was the key figure in government who 
backed the idea of deploying Polaris East of Suez, and the desire to play a continuing 
world role, albeit at a reduced cost, was part of his thinking. But the scheme was also 
wrapped up in several genuine dilemmas of British defence and foreign policy, and the 
question of how Britain could best protect Western interests in a post-imperial world.1 
 
The Context 
Through the Nassau agreement of December 1962, which underwrote the purchase of the 
Polaris missile system from the United States, the British government avowed that the 
weapon would be used ‘for the purposes of international defence of the Western alliance’ 
except where ‘supreme national interests’ dictated otherwise.2  Although Labour was 
pledged by its election manifesto to ‘internationalise’ Polaris, and so to renounce the 
pretence of an independent deterrent, after Wilson assumed office it was decided to 
continue with the construction of the submarines. The working assumption was that the 
missiles were to be employed in accordance with the Nassau agreement and so eventually 
allocated for targeting purposes to the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR).  
Events in Asia were, however, conspiring to throw a degree of uncertainty into this 
picture, and to generate new ideas over deployment options which challenged the 
primacy of the NATO commitment. 
 
On 16 October 1964, in the middle of the election campaign that brought Labour 
to power, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) exploded its first nuclear device.  
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Although this event had little immediate impact on the strategic situation in Asia, as 
China had few weapons and effective means of delivery, in psychological and political 
terms it marked an important shift.  Already having fought a border war with China in 
October-November 1962, where it received a sharp reminder of its own military 
inadequacies, India felt it was now especially vulnerable to Chinese nuclear intimidation.  
Moreover, Indian anxieties only increased as the PRC improved its own ties with 
Pakistan, which remained locked in its bitter dispute with India over Kashmir.   As the 
former colonial power in the subcontinent, as well as head of the Commonwealth, the 
British wrestled with the intractable problems of balancing the interests of India and 
Pakistan. Following the Sino-Indian war, Britain had begun military aid to New Delhi 
and promised to ‘consult’ in the event of another attack, but this merely served to annoy 
Pakistan.3 Meanwhile, voices within India were pressing the government to embark on its 
own full-scale programme of nuclear development, sparking widespread concern over the 
dangers of nuclear proliferation in Asia.  Indeed, by late 1964, with the impact of the 
recent Chinese nuclear test still reverberating around Asia, it had become a cardinal 
British interest, shared also by Lyndon Johnson’s administration in Washington, to deter 
India from developing its own atomic bomb, or turning to the Soviet Union for 
protection.  One outcome of this set of circumstances was the emergence of the idea of a 
nuclear guarantee which might be offered to India and other non-nuclear powers in order 
to protect them from nuclear blackmail. Indian premier Lal Bahadur Shastri raised this 
with Wilson when visiting London in December 1964, arguing that a guarantee would 
help him resist domestic pressure to build a bomb. India, however, was a non-aligned 
country and a key element in Shastri’s scheme was that the guarantee must be a joint one 
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from both Superpowers. It also faced objections from Pakistan.  British and American 
officials, furthermore, did not want to tie themselves to a commitment which might 
encourage India itself to behave in a more assertive manner.4  
 
In March 1965 the US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, raised with Michael 
Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, the question of whether a ‘Commonwealth Nuclear 
Force’ had been considered for the Far East.5  Though this conversation caught the Prime 
Minister’s eye, Stewart was – and would remain - unenthusiastic, arguing that, ‘a bilateral 
Anglo-American Force in the Pacific area would not in present circumstances be in 
British interests.  Our nuclear capability in the area will always be minimal compared 
with what the United States can deploy there.’6 Ministers discussed ideas for a nuclear 
guarantee on 31 March 1965, when it was agreed that Britain could not act alone on the 
issue.7 The most the Americans were prepared to consider, however, was a UN resolution 
supporting those who faced nuclear aggression and the idea of both Superpowers taking 
part in an ‘umbrella’ was ruled out by the Soviets in discussions with the Indians: 
Moscow was not ready to work with Washington on such an overtly anti-Chinese 
project.8 By June 1965 it was apparent that the Americans too were proceeding very 
cautiously with ideas for nuclear guarantees, and India’s own interest had soon all but 
evaporated, not least due to the distraction of all-out war with Pakistan in September 
1965. Once the dust settled, India, concerned over further Chinese nuclear tests, returned 
to its pressure for a nuclear umbrella. But when the Indian foreign minister, Swaran 
Singh, met Wilson in June 1966, it was clear that India would still accept nothing less 
than a joint US-Soviet guarantee.9 In the wake of this meeting, Sir Solly Zuckerman, the 
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government’s Chief Scientist Adviser, and an influential voice on the military nuclear 
scene, concluded that nothing could be done on the ‘umbrella’ front.  Britain could not 
act alone and a US-Soviet agreement was impossible for the foreseeable future.10 
Nevertheless, throughout this period, the Indian problem and related dangers of nuclear 
proliferation became a principal argument used by the Prime Minister when proposing a 
Polaris deployment East of Suez. 
 
Wilson’s interest in such schemes may also have been related to Britain’s 
declining abilities to commit conventional forces to the defence of South East Asia.  A 
British nuclear contribution in the area could offer some kind of a substitute, especially to 
nervous and critical allies such as Australia, New Zealand and the United States.  London 
had first made a declaration of nuclear capability to the South East Asia Treaty 
Organization (SEATO) in March 1957, even though the means to sustain were, in fact, 
lacking.11 Over the next few years, plans were drawn up to fly out V-bombers with 
atomic weapons to the Far East in the emergency period that might precede Chinese 
aggression. A nuclear bomb store would also be built at RAF Tengah on Singapore, the 
runway extended to accommodate fully-loaded V-bombers, and the resident Canberra 
light bomber squadron given a nuclear capability.   Keen not to be usurped by the Air 
Force, the Royal Navy also planned to deploy a fleet carrier with nuclear-capable aircraft 
to the region from 1960 onwards.   ‘The justification for our retaining nuclear weapons in 
the area is political,’ one report explained in August 1961, ‘If we no longer have such 
weapons ourselves we will largely forfeit our capacity to influence American policy and 
to restrain them if they wish to act foolishly.’12  By the summer of 1962, the bomb store 
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at Tengah had been completed, and the Canberra force reequipped for a possible nuclear 
role.  Yet British plans were in danger of being overtaken by the pressures of anti-
colonial nationalism and rapid political change. 
 
Radicalism in Singapore threatened to make retention of the RAF base 
impossible, so, rather than direct the colony to separate independence, the Macmillan 
government wanted to merge it with Malaya and the Borneo territories into a new 
Malaysian federation, centred on Kuala Lumpur.  Friendly relations with the federal 
authorities underpinned by a defence agreement would, it was supposed, allow for 
continuing free use of the base facilities at Singapore. But when Malaysia was formed in 
September 1963 it proved anything but a source of regional stability.  Indonesian hostility 
to the whole federal scheme was manifest in the policy of ‘confrontation’, an attempt to 
subvert the new state through guerrilla raids in Borneo, sporadic attacks on peninsula 
Malaysia and a barrage of propaganda alleging that the British were still the ‘puppet-
masters’ behind the federation. Then, in August 1965, the communal political tensions in 
Malaysia were made manifest when Singapore quit the federation.  These developments 
placed the future of RAF Tengah in doubt. With withdrawal from Singapore increasingly 
on the cards as defence cuts hit home and confrontation came to a close in 1966, the 
retention of a nuclear capability in the Far East into the 1970s would have to rely on the 
Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers.13  However, the defence review undertaken by the Wilson 
Government throughout 1965 was to culminate in the decision announced in the February 
1966 Defence White Paper to cancel orders for a next generation of carriers.  With the 
present carriers due to retire from the mid-1970s, and tenure of the Singapore base for 
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nuclear deployment uncertain, question marks would soon hand over Britain’s ability to 
maintain its nuclear capability in the Far East. 
 
Another important factor leading to plans for a Polaris force East of Suez was 
Labour’s decision to maintain the world role. Soon after taking office key ministers met 
at Chequers to discuss defence, where the Treasury secured agreement to limit defence 
spending to a ceiling of £2 billion by 1969-70, despite the cuts this would entail. Meeting 
in order to determine how savings were to be found a Long-term Study Group of officials 
from several departments recommended giving priority to European defence, partly 
because it was so vital to Britain’s own security. But ministers believed it possible to find 
reductions in the European setting, where stable deterrence was thought to exist, and 
believed Britain could play an important role East of Suez, where the East-West balance 
was more fluid.14 In December 1964 British thinking was outlined to the Americans 
during Wilson’s first summit with President Johnson. The Defence Secretary, Denis 
Healey, explained why priority would be given to deployments outside the NATO area: 
‘The main reasons underlying this view were our moral obligations as senior member of 
the Commonwealth, our treaty obligations…, the positive contribution that we (almost 
alone between Suez and Singapore) could make to the preservation of stability in many 
parts of the world, and our judgment that the danger of a major war in Europe was very 
small.’ Dean Rusk and the US Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, were keen to 
support Healey’s analysis. ‘There were some parts of the world in which Britain could 
take a stand that was difficult for the United States’, declared Rusk, ‘and the American 
administration would look with the greatest concern on any plan for a deliberate 
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withdrawal of British influence from any part of the world...’15  For the Prime Minister, 
deploying Polaris east of Suez meshed easily with the aspiration to maintain influence on 
a world-wide stage, and so continue to win favour with the Americans, and counteract 
their suspicions that the British wanted to back out of their Far Eastern commitments. 
 
By the mid-1960s, ‘removing’ Polaris from the European scene when it arrived in 
service was also a possible answer to the nuclear sharing problem which had come to 
bedevil the Western alliance.  On arriving in office in October 1964, the Labour 
government, like its Conservative predecessor, had mounted strong objection to the US 
scheme to create a Multilateral Force (MLF), which might both contain West Germany’s 
nuclear ambitions, and give NATO its own theatre nuclear capability.  The British 
alternative, formerly proposed to the alliance in late 1964, was the Atlantic Nuclear Force 
(ANF), where some existing national nuclear weapons systems, such as Britain’s V-
bombers, alongside an American contribution, would be placed under a system of joint 
control, rather than the shared ownership and even manning of a wholly new force that 
lay at the heart of the MLF scheme.  Although ANF had few enthusiastic supporters on 
the British side, it was recognised as a necessary expedient if the Americans were to drop 
MLF, and the Germans brought round to a proposal which offered them some tangible 
and attractive involvement in alliance nuclear affairs, but which fell short of a fully 
mixed-manned force.16 
 
During 1965, however, the underlying rationale behind both the original MLF 
scheme and its ANF rival began to fall under serious doubt as nuclear questions were the 
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cause of domestic political controversy in West Germany.  With an election due at the 
end of the year the Chancellor, Ludwig Erhard, decided not to press for the MLF at 
present, and attention began to turn to different approaches to nuclear sharing within the 
alliance. Impetus began to build within NATO during 1965 away from ‘hardware’ 
solutions, which dealt with the physical control of particular weapons systems, toward 
‘software’ solutions, involving new mechanisms providing for formal nuclear planning 
arrangements and joint consultation over use (seen as increasingly necessary as the 
alliance moved gradually to adopt a flexible response strategy).17 In this context, Britain’s 
own ANF proposals began to fade from the scene, along with the idea of 
‘internationalising’ Polaris as part of a shared NATO force, so allowing officials to 
consider more seriously wider deployment options, including East of Suez.  The latter 
course also had the attraction, at least to some, of taking Polaris completely out of the 
West European nuclear equation, where its separate and conspicuous existence as a 
nationally-controlled independent nuclear force might still be the source of long-term 
resentment to the non-nuclear members of the alliance, above all West Germany.   
 
The Proposal launched 
The idea of a Polaris deployment East of Suez first emerged in the wake of Shastri’s visit 
to London in December 1964 and the discussion of nuclear guarantees to India.  The 
Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office (FO), Sir Harold Caccia, prepared a 
paper for discussion with the Ministry of Defence on the role of the remaining British 
nuclear forces outside the NATO area.   This was followed, in late January, by a fuller 
FO Planning Staff submission, arguing that Britain would need to maintain a nuclear 
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capability in the Far East if she was to join with the US in offering nuclear assurances to 
India, and also, in the absence of such guarantees, if India were to acquire nuclear 
weapons.  In addition, the Planning Staff felt that a nuclear capability helped to deter 
overt Indonesian aggression against Malaysia, was a shield for Australia and New 
Zealand and enhanced Britain’s standing in SEATO, while its removal could have an 
adverse effect on the security of Hong Kong.  But it recognised that security of tenure of 
the Singapore base could not be assured in the long-term and that alternative means of 
deployment would therefore have to be studied.18 Thinking at this time, then, was very 
much focused on Britain’s contribution to security in Asia, not only the need to provide 
reassurances to India but also to provide a broader defence against Chinese and 
Indonesian pressures.  
 
The first short study of the practical issues raised by Polaris deployment east of 
Suez was compiled by the Navy Department in January 1965, when Healey had asked 
about the repercussions of cancelling the fifth Polaris submarine on this option. With five 
boats, the Chief of the Naval Staff made clear, it would be possible to deploy one 
submarine on continuous patrol in the Indian or Pacific Oceans using existing support 
facilities. But, they noted in a gloomy fashion, a four-boat force would not offer this 
provision ‘without very expensive support facilities which at the present do not exist nor 
are planned.’  In the latter case, a specially-equipped Polaris depot ship would be needed, 
costing £18-20 million and taking six years to build and deploy.  The whole force would 
also need a suitable base from which to operate, such as Fremantle in Australia 19  The 
high initial costs for a depot ship, a necessity once the government decided that the fifth 
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Polaris submarine would be cancelled at the end of January, meant that little further 
thought was given to the subject.  However, the Navy Department drew up another study 
in June 1965 pointing out that a depot ship was already planned for use by other 
submarines East of Suez.  Currently in the planning stage, it was due to be ordered in 
October 1968 and available from July 1972. If it were fitted out ‘for but not with’ Polaris 
handling facilities the additional costs could be kept down to only £0.5 million. Polaris 
submarines could then be deployed East of Suez with two year’s notice at a cost of £4 
million in actually fitting out the depot ship for them. This was clearly a much better 
financial prospect and after considering it, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) recommended that 
the option should be kept open as ‘a wise insurance plan.’ Healey agreed. As will become 
clear below, the fact that the scheme could be kept open at such low cost, was a major 
reason why it survived for as long as it did.20  
 
There the matter rested until later in the year, when work on the defence review 
focused on nuclear questions. The Cabinet Secretary, Burke Trend, who held a central 
position in co-ordinating the review and had ready access to Wilson, told the Prime 
Minister on 12 November 1965 that, if quadripartite co-operation were developed East of 
Suez between Britain, America, Australia and New Zealand it would naturally lead on to 
questions about Britain’s nuclear capability and India’s nuclear ambitions. Trend talked 
of Britain contributing to a ‘nuclear force in the Indo-Pacific area.’ He was apparently 
more open to the idea, as a way to secure British interests in an alliance context, than 
Stewart had been in March.21 Trend’s arguments evidently had an effect because, on 26 
November, with Stewart and Healey sitting alongside him, Wilson mooted the possibility 
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of sending Polaris East of Suez in a meeting with two visiting American policymakers, 
McNamara and Under-Secretary of State George Ball. Rather than focusing on Asian 
security, the Prime Minister argued that such a step would help give West Germany 
equality on nuclear issues in Europe. And at this point Healey seemed to support the 
proposal, stating that it was ‘a practical problem of what to do with the Polaris boats… 
for the benefit of the free world as a whole.’22 A few days after that Wilson told Stewart 
that the ‘Defence review should include an examination of the question whether the four 
Polaris submarines should be East or West of Suez, or divided between.’23 
 
In December there was another chance to discuss the issue with the Americans 
when Wilson visited Lyndon Johnson in Washington. After his arrival, the Prime 
Minister had a short private meeting with the President where he repeated Britain’s offer 
to commit Polaris to an ANF, then added ‘he did not think we needed as many missiles as 
we already have in the Atlantic area’; rather, ‘we ought to consider using the British 
Polaris as part of some international security arrangement east of Suez.’24 After more 
officials joined them and the subject turned to nuclear sharing in Europe, Wilson again 
mentioned the notion of ‘transferring our Polarises to East of Suez as the way out’; and, 
when discussing the defence review, he noted that ‘we might switch the Polarises to East 
of Suez to help counter the Chinese threat.’25  The following day, in a meeting with 
McNamara, Ball and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy - with no other British 
minister present - Wilson updated the Americans on the state of the Defence review and 
again mentioned the deployment of Polaris submarines ‘as part of a collective defence 
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arrangement in the Far East.’ According to the British record McNamara ‘expressed great 
interest’ and Wilson went on to explain its logic more fully: 
As he saw it, the West was already adequately equipped with missiles and nuclear 
weapons to counter the Russian threat. The British Polaris submarines would only 
represent an insignificant part of the total nuclear capability available to NATO, 
and their role in the European context was accordingly more political than 
military. Now that China was becoming a nuclear Power he thought they could be 
more useful from a military point of view in the Indo-Pacific area. 
Wilson also briefly told key Commonwealth leaders about his thinking at this point. He 
saw Canada’s Lester Pearson and argued that an East of Suez deployment could take 
‘some of the heat out of German nuclear aspirations’; and the proposal was mentioned in 
Wilson’s reports about the Washington summit to Australia’s Robert Menzies and New 
Zealand’s Keith Holyoake.26 
 
Thus, in the closing months of 1965, the Polaris East of Suez proposal moved 
from being a low-profile option within the defence establishment to being a subject for 
discussion by the Prime Minister at international level. It fitted British aspirations to play 
a continuing military role in the Far East, guarantee Indian security and somehow 
internationalise the nuclear deterrent and remove it from the NATO context so that this 
did not offend German sensibilities. Moreover, the scheme seemed to have sympathy 
from the Prime Minister, the Defence Secretary, the Secretary of the Cabinet, and the 
Chief Scientist. There were even signs of positive American interest, McNamara 
avowing: ‘the idea of deploying [the] Polaris submarines in the Far East was well worth 
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closer examination.  The relationship of such a deployment to the defence of India, and 
the whole problem of India’s nuclear intention seemed very important.’27 Yet, despite 
Wilson’s enthusiasm it was clear many details of the scheme had not been worked 
through. Even the Prime Minister thought its relationship to any nuclear guarantee for 
India was ‘obscure’; it was also debateable whether the withdrawal of British missiles 
would help in the debate over nuclear sharing in NATO (significantly, the Prime Minister 
asked the Americans not to mention the proposal to the West Germans); and, as to 
internationalisation he could only say that this would be achieved ‘in some way’ as part 
of a broader, quadripartite arrangement. It would not take long for weaknesses in the 
scheme to be exposed.  Indeed, viewed with hindsight, December 1965 stands out as the 
high point of the whole proposal. 
 
The Proposal stalls 
After returning from Washington, Wilson asked for a paper to be drawn up by the FO for 
the Overseas Policy and Defence Committee (OPD), the key Cabinet committee in the 
international field. An initial discussion was held by civil servants on OPD’s subsidiary 
Official Committee on 7 January 1966 where it was argued that Polaris submarines 
‘would make a larger proportionate contribution to Western forces East of Suez than they 
could ever do in the European theatre’ and that it might be possible to ‘bargain’ this for a 
reduction in British conventional forces in the region. The last was an attractive option 
because conventional forces were expensive to maintain, required an array of bases and 
facilities and were likely to stir up nationalist resentment locally. But there were many 
negatives: the submarines would be out of range of their targets while travelling to the 
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Indian Ocean; there ‘were many other complicated factors’ such as setting up a 
communications network, providing relief crews at long distance and siting a depot ship 
in the area; and there were already indications that German pressure might be turning the 
Americans against Wilson’s proposal.28 This final point was especially important for 
reducing the momentum of the scheme, just as it seemed about to pick up more speed. 
 
As we have seen, during 1965 it had seemed that West Germany would let MLF 
fade away, allowing ‘nuclear sharing’ to be solved by a process of consultation rather 
than joint control. But, with the German elections out of the way, Erhard arrived in 
Washington, only a few days after Wilson, and revived the ‘hardware’ solution. The 
Germans were happy to look at Britain’s ANF proposal, but only if it were altered to 
provide an element of mixed-manning in which Germans could participate. Erhard and 
Johnson sent a copy of a German memorandum to Wilson, the President urging that it 
should be studied seriously. As it transpired nothing came of these German efforts. 
Wilson cleverly responded that he would look at their ideas, but said he also hoped 
progress could continue on a system of nuclear consultation (McNamara and Healey had, 
in fact, only just recently held meetings with their NATO partners on a new Nuclear 
Committee to discuss procedures for joint planning). With an election called for March 
1966, the Prime Minister also had an excuse for further delay.  In that same month NATO 
was shaken by the French decision to withdraw, and the overriding attention of the US 
administration was drawn to coping with this crisis and reinvigorating the alliance and its 
underlying structures. At another meeting with Johnson in September 1966, Erhard 
finally killed off the hardware option by conceding that no progress was possible on that 
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front, and meanwhile NATO moved ahead with the discussions that were to lead to the 
formation of the Nuclear Planning Group.29 Even though the British were now free once 
more to consider wider deployment options, the German memorandum of December 
1965 had come at a difficult point for Wilson, and had complicated his efforts to push 
forward his favoured scheme, just as important decisions were looming on the defence 
review. By the time Erhard finally abandoned the hardware solution, moreover, stronger 
objections to the East of Suez scheme had emerged in Whitehall. 
  
 The key issue in the debates that led to the February 1966 White Paper on defence 
was how to meet Britain’s future commitments in the Far East while staying within the 
new spending ceilings.  For Burke Trend, as he informed Wilson, a Polaris submarine 
deployment in the Far East ‘might enable us to make, without any additional expenditure, 
a contribution’ to allied defence efforts in the region, and so allay some of the concerns 
felt by the United States, Australia and New Zealand, that with Indonesian confrontation 
winding down, Britain would pull back its military forces from the area altogether. 
Indeed, Trend’s logic was that, in the event of a decision to cut back on aircraft carriers 
(as occurred) an initiative to send out the submarines would put ‘a better complexion’ on 
the situation. Trend wanted to keep studying the Polaris, East of Suez option, despite 
Erhard’s latest move on nuclear sharing. ‘The Americans were clearly attracted by this 
idea when you first put it to them…’ he reminded Wilson.30 Therefore, for Trend, as it 
seems also for Zuckerman, the option was a way of maintaining a high British profile in 
the Far East at low cost, an ideal option - it might seem – for a country desperate to 
reduce defence costs without losing its global influence.31 
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Sympathy for the option was also still evident from the COS when they discussed 
a memorandum about it on 20 January. Focusing on military rather than political issues, 
the paper argued that, using Britain as a base, once all the Polaris submarines were 
available in 1969 it should be possible to keep one East of Suez for half the year in an 
‘emergency’. Keeping one out on a sustained basis would require a depot ship or the use 
of a naval base, such as the American one at Guam. Nevertheless, the targeting options 
presented by an Indian Ocean deployment seemed more attractive than previously 
recognized: from a standard patrol area off the southern tip of India, a firing position in 
the Bay of Bengal could be reached in four days which would place Beijing within range.  
Furthermore, a firing position in the Arabian Sea, also within four days of travel, would 
allow the missiles to reach various urban targets in the Soviet Union, including Moscow, 
as well as many of the medium range ballistic missile sites that featured in SACEUR’s 
target plans for British forces.32 In considering the report the COS were sceptical about 
using Guam, whose use would demand dollar expenditure, but a permanent deployment 
supported by a depot ship was a different matter. True, the costs of keeping the option 
open had gone up over the past six months, with estimates of depot ship design now put 
at £3-5 million, with a decision to proceed on this being needed in May 1966. But the 
Chiefs again advised Healey to keep the option open.33 
 
Nonetheless, despite such support and his own sympathy for the proposal, Trend 
advised Wilson on 21 January 1966 that there were strong arguments against an 
immediate decision by the OPD. This was largely because of the problems within NATO. 
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While it might be possible to target the Soviet Union from East of Suez, Britain’s 
European allies were unlikely to see such a deployment as fulfilling a NATO role; as 
long as the nuclear sharing issue remained unresolved with Germany, withdrawal of 
British forces from the Atlantic was inadvisable.34  By now it was felt that, for reasons of 
logistics and effectiveness the Polaris force should not be split between two theatres, 
which meant the choice was between the Atlantic or East of Suez. At the OPD meeting 
on 23 January, Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, echoed Trend by arguing that, 
given the state of discussions on nuclear sharing, Polaris had to remain in the Atlantic, at 
least in the immediate term. Nevertheless, Stewart, who had long been sceptical about an 
East of Suez deployment, did not rule out the option for the future, should ‘unexpected 
developments in Europe’ mean a deployment there was unnecessary, while the attitudes 
of Britain’s allies would be crucial to any decision. This allowed Wilson to conclude the 
discussion with a compromise: no decisions should yet be taken, but the option would be 
left open and further discussions held with the Americans by Stewart and Healey on a 
forthcoming visit to Washington.  But it is significant that Healey too, for reasons that are 
unclear, now struck a sceptical tone, pointing to the additional costs involved in sending 
and supplying the submarines East of Suez.35 Equally important, opinion in Washington 
was had also moved against the proposal.  
 
The future of any scheme to deploy Polaris East of Suez was always going to 
depend on American attitudes, particularly given British reliance on the US for 
submarine navigation and communications in the Indo-Pacific, and also because, to allow 
such a deployment, re-negotiation of the Nassau Agreement would probably have been 
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required.  The apparently positive response of McNamara to Wilson in late 1965 soon 
gave way to doubt.  Strong opposition emerged from Walt Rostow, head of the State 
Department’s Policy Planning Council, who told President Johnson that a formal 
arrangement that allocated important Chinese targets to a British Polaris force would 
mean ‘something close to a British veto over our China policy.  It is highly unlikely that 
domestic politics will allow any government in London to go to war against mainland 
China; and we could count on the UK influence consistently to make difficult any firm 
stand vis-à-vis mainland China.’  Rostow also saw the proposal as running counter to 
American support for British membership of the European Community, which he hoped 
would encourage the Europeans to play a more active East of Suez role. ‘An Anglo-
Saxon Asian defence club, built on what appeared to be a special London-Washington 
relation [sic], would discourage rather than encourage other Europeans to move towards 
responsibility in Asia.  It would also complicate eventual UK entry into Europe and deny 
the British and ourselves the correct strategy of having British entry into Europe serve as 
a way of leading Europe as a whole to assume increased responsibilities East of Suez and 
on the world scene.’36 Preparing for the Stewart-Healey visit at the end of January 1966, 
the State and Defense Departments suspected the Polaris proposal arose from a desire to 
release British conventional forces in the Far East from what were described as ‘the 
difficult and unpopular tasks of a non-strategic nature.’ Rusk and McNamara were 
therefore more reserved when the topic came up during the visit, being ‘more inclined to 
give priority to the continued assignment of the Polaris submarines to NATO.’37 For the 
Americans, deploying Polaris East of Suez was now seen as a strategic irrelevance, 
diverting attention from the more urgent problems of nuclear issues in NATO, and a none 
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too subtle cloak intended to cover British desires to cut their conventional forces in South 
East Asia. 
 
The Proposal survives 
The OPD discussion of January 1966 and the lukewarm American attitude meant that, 
barely a month after its debut on the world stage, the East of Suez option faded into the 
background even in London. Yet no one felt the need to deliver it the coup de grace and, 
despite the doubts of Stewart, Healey and the Americans it was still under active 
discussion within the British government two years’ later. Why was this? One important 
reason was that the cost of keeping the option open was low. As seen above, the paper 
that went before the COS in January suggested that a Polaris-capable depot ship could 
cost an extra £5 million and that a decision on proceeding with this might be necessary in 
May. The OPD Official Committee felt the figure too high and suggested that the new 
depot ship should be built without Polaris facilities. If a decision on these lines had been 
made at that time, then the whole East of Suez scheme could have disappeared. But, 
further studies showed that the two designs for a depot ship – that is, one with or without 
Polaris facilities – were not as incompatible as had been assumed. Once again, it was 
estimated that a Polaris option could be kept open for only £0.5 million on top of the 
conventional vessel. It would not be necessary to invest more heavily until the ship was 
put out to tender, perhaps as late as 1968. The COS again felt it better to keep options 
open and, without referring the issue to ministers, decided to design a depot ship that 
might be able to cope with Polaris submarines.38 In practical terms, the East of Suez 
project remained a going concern.  
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The other factor that kept the proposal alive was the persistent support it received 
from the Prime Minister, despite a distinct thinning out of allies on the matter. In July 
1966 his interest was reactivated by a minute from Healey requesting approval for 
detailed target planning for Polaris to begin with SACEUR. While agreeing, Wilson also 
asked that the East of Suez option be given fresh examination.39 The following month, 
when the OPD discussed Indian nuclear ambitions, he argued that deployment East of 
Suez ‘could help to provide a guarantee to India’ while also allowing ‘substantial 
economies on our other forces in the Far East.’40 The Prime Minister also tried to ensure 
fuller ministerial support this time around. On 11 August 1966, George Brown replaced 
the sceptical Stewart as Foreign Secretary. It was always clear that the two would differ 
over East of Suez commitments since Brown, who was ardently committed to 
membership of the European Community, had also long been critical of the world role. 
But now Wilson told his new Foreign Secretary that, if they could agree on nuclear 
policy, ‘and if the Polaris submarines could be based soon in the Far East, “you can have 
what you want in Europe”.’41 Clearly determined not to forsake the option without yet 
more study, he also raised the issue at a meeting of ministers on 22 October.42  
 
Wilson now decided to re-fashion the government’s decision-making on nuclear 
matters by creating a Ministerial Committee on Nuclear Policy.  It was to the second 
meeting of this new Committee, rather than the OPD, that the option was referred in 
January 1967.  The minutes are withheld but the relevant memorandum confirms the 
balance of arguments was against him. They are worth rehearsing because they show just 
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what an uphill struggle Wilson faced on the logistical, economic and political levels in 
keeping the option alive. Logistically, only one submarine could be kept on patrol at any 
time East of Suez, in contrast to three operating from a UK base. The long supply line 
would also mean purchasing more missiles, gear and spares from the US; and there 
would be the extra costs for flying out crews and spares from the UK. Economically, 
although it might be cheap to keep the option open, the total additional cost of an actual 
East of Suez deployment, as opposed to a NATO one, was reckoned to be £15 million 
over ten years. Politically there was a host of problems. The Nassau agreement, which 
bound Britain to commit the Polaris missiles to NATO, would probably have to be 
renegotiated and European allies, including West Germany, could be offended by a 
British decision to deploy the submarines elsewhere. It was unlikely that a Polaris force 
would make Britain’s allies East of Suez more open to cuts in her conventional forces 
(which were of much more practical use than strategic nuclear weapons), and there were 
problems with predicting the future Asian scene. Despite the hopes of using Polaris to 
reassure India about Chinese nuclear blackmail, even the Indians, sensitive about their 
non-aligned status, might be critical of such a force. Labour’s commitment to 
‘internationalizing’ the deterrent was another problem because, while this was easy to 
achieve through NATO, there was no similarly strong organization covering the Indo-
Pacific, where an entirely new four-power defence agreement, with a nuclear component, 
would probably be required.43  
 
Trend put a more positive slant on the position in a minute to Wilson on 6 January 
1967. A Polaris force might contribute to a quadripartite military arrangement in South-
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east Asia, it could provide a nuclear umbrella to India and, by removing the British 
strategic deterrent from the European theatre, it might ease German nuclear aspirations 
for equal treatment within NATO.  But Trend also had to acknowledge that conventional 
military strength, not nuclear, was probably the only currency that would register with 
Britain’s allies in South East Asia; that India only wanted a nuclear guarantee that also 
involved the Soviet Union; and that, while the German desire to control nuclear weapons 
was less acute, ‘the moment when we are embarking on a new attempt to enter the EEC is 
hardly the moment at which to embark on a policy which would result in France’s 
becoming the only nuclear power in Europe….’  (In January, Wilson and Brown began a 
series of visits to Community capitals to test the possibility of a membership bid.) Taking 
into account the £15 million extra expenditure the scheme might cost over a decade, 
Trend thought there were ‘sufficiently formidable’ arguments against any definite 
decision for its adoption, but he still considered the option should be kept open.44  At the 
Nuclear Policy Committee meeting, ministers simply agreed to consider the issue again 
later in the year.45 
 
Yet all the time support for the project was ebbing away. In June 1967 David 
Bruce, the US Ambassador in London, was told by Frank Cooper, a senior official in the 
Ministry of Defence, that despite the Prime Minister’s persistence in ‘hanging on’ to the 
idea, stationing Polaris East of Suez was regarded as a ‘non-starter’ in both his own 
ministry and the FO.46 This seems to have been an accurate reflection of the situation. 
Indeed, on 23 May, as part of a wide-ranging report to the Cabinet on defence 
expenditure, the centre-piece of which was the decision to withdraw from mainland bases 
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in South East Asia, Healey made a number of negative points about an East of Suez 
deployment: there was no evidence that Britain’s allies in the region wanted this; it would 
require renegotiation of the Nassau agreement, which could give Washington 
‘opportunities for raising wider issues to our disadvantage’; and withdrawal of the Polaris 
fleet from NATO ‘might damage not only our military relations with our European allies, 
but also our prospects of negotiating entry to the Common Market on acceptable terms.’47 
Healey clearly wanted to foreclose the option.48 The Prime Minister, however, was not 
yet prepared to concede defeat. On 24 July he even told Brown that a decision on whether 
to base Polaris East of Suez should be taken in October.49 But events continued to move 
against such schemes. In August 1967, Healey informed ministers on the Nuclear Policy 
Committee that terms for assigning the Polaris force to SACEUR for targeting purposes 
were ready to be implemented.  This ‘would not prevent… redeployment East of Suez 
from 1972 onwards, if that course were later to commend itself’, but to several Whitehall 
officials, Burke Trend included, it now seemed unrealistic, at least in the short term, to 
propose deployment East of Suez.50 By now Wilson’s only firm support seems to have 
come from the COS who, at a meeting of 22 August were again keen to keep the option 
open, a line they had consistently taken through the saga.51 
 
The Proposal abandoned 
The scheme for sending Polaris East of Suez was overwhelmed by the economic shocks 
of late 1967. The November decisions over devaluation forced a fresh look at defence 
spending, as the new Chancellor of the Exchequer, Roy Jenkins, pressed for further cuts. 
The issue of sending Polaris East of Suez was not touched on in the series of Cabinet 
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meetings between 4 and 15 January 1968, where it was agreed to quit both South East 
Asia and the Persian Gulf by March 1971. There were, in fact, two decisions that 
suggested that the Polaris East of Suez scheme could survive. First, amid all the emphasis 
on retreat, ministers did agree to retain a ‘capability’ for sending forces East of Suez.52 
And secondly, the British held onto the Polaris programme: Jenkins had argued, in a 
Nuclear Policy Committee meeting in early January, for its cancellation, but Wilson and 
other ministers successfully fought for its retention.53 However, a further effect of the 
decisions over withdrawal was that, with no continuing conventional naval presence 
based in the Indian Ocean, the estimated costs of a Polaris deployment in the area had 
increased markedly.54 Of particular importance was the decision, taken by the Navy in 
March, to cancel the depot ship planned for the Indian Ocean. A staff study had shown 
that, with defence services now focused on the European theatre, it was possible to make 
do with existing depot ships.55 This threw back into the melting pot the whole issue of 
how to support Polaris submarines if they were sent East of Suez.  
 
The Navy Department began to study ways around the dilemma but it was clear 
that any Indian Ocean deployment for Polaris must be now put back many years and 
involve much-increased costs. The options for dealing with the situation were hardly 
attractive, including as they did the building of an expensive purpose-built vessel.56 
Unsurprisingly, the Navy decided the East of Suez proposal was ‘one of the sacrifices 
which we are likely to offer up in any further exercise to save money.’57 And in June the 
key ministers – Healey, Stewart (back at the FO after Brown had resigned from the 
government), Jenkins and Commonwealth Secretary George Thomson – wrote to Wilson 
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arguing that it was no longer necessary to make provision for a Polaris deployment East 
of Suez.  All earlier assumptions about retaining forces in the Indian Ocean, Healey 
argued, had ‘been invalidated’ by the January 1968 defence cuts.  If a Polaris force were 
to be deployed it would be a stand-alone project with additional costs now estimated at 
£35 million in capital and £5 million a year in running costs. Perhaps as a sop to Wilson, 
it was conceded that the deployment option could always be revived in future, with about 
five years’ notice, including building a depot ship.58 On 28 June Healey reported the 
decision to the OPD, in the midst of a broad update on the defence review. Significantly 
it was Wilson who, in summing up the ensuing discussion, said the Committee ‘agreed 
that no provision should be made to keep open the option to deploy Polaris submarines 
East of Suez.’59  
 
Conclusion 
In its early stages the proposal for deploying Polaris East of Suez had high level support 
from Wilson, Healey, Trend and Zuckerman. Even the Americans at first seemed 
receptive to the idea in December 1965. The arguments mustered for the proposal at that 
time may even be seen as answering a number of challenges to British policy. War in 
Europe was unlikely, whereas Asia was unstable, and Britain had a long-standing 
presence in the Indian Ocean that gave it significance in American eyes. The Vietnam 
War made this more obvious because the last thing Americans wanted was to pick up the 
threads of Western security in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. Sending Polaris East of 
Suez offered a way for Britain to maintain a high profile presence in the Indian Ocean at 
relatively low cost, while reducing conventional forces in the region. Wilson, who 
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persisted with the scheme even after he decided on application for European Community 
membership, was not the last British premier to seek a European and a world role 
simultaneously. 
 
 But on close analysis, the idea never made great sense. At the FO Stewart seems 
to have quickly dismissed it, even if some of his officials had a role in it.  Healey also 
soon turned against it for reasons that are unclear, though it is possible to speculate that 
this was wrapped up in his desire to escape all entanglements East of Suez, as well as his 
role in establishing the Nuclear Planning Group within NATO in 1966, where Polaris was 
a potent symbol of British commitment to the nuclear arrangements of the Western 
alliance. The days of Empire were over and Britain lacked the resources necessary to 
project its military power globally. Rather than getting involved in an uncertain Asian 
future, policy under Labour became focused on escaping from Far East commitments, 
hence the determination to reduce conventional forces in the region, which might get 
dragged into local disputes like the Malaysian-Indonesian confrontation.60 Wilson, of 
course, carefully avoided any involvement in Vietnam. American interest in Wilson’s 
scheme soon evaporated when Washington considered the undesirability of sharing 
American decision-making on the Far East with Britain and preferred Polaris to remain 
dedicated to NATO. During 1966-67 the costs of keeping the option open remained low 
and this simple fact, regularly repeated by the COS, did much to aid its survival. The 
issue of nuclear sharing with Germany also receded because Erhard abandoned a 
‘hardware’ solution in favour of improved consultation within NATO. But by then 
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Polaris was in the process of being allocated to SACEUR for targeting purposes, a 
process that would have been difficult to reverse.  
 
Besides the technical problems of such a long-range deployment and the financial 
costs involved of maintaining just one submarine on constant patrol East of Suez, none of 
Britain’s allies in the Far East showed any interest in a Polaris deployment. Even India, 
despite its desire for a nuclear ‘umbrella’ was likely to oppose the scheme because of 
having a non-aligned, anti-imperial foreign policy. Besides, as Rusk told Wilson in 1965 
the real danger, in military terms, was neither nuclear war nor even conventional conflict, 
but ‘wars of national liberation’, such as Vietnam.61 Although this argument did not 
feature prominently in the British discussions about an East of Suez deployment, Polaris 
missiles were a blunt, not to say useless, weapon in such circumstances.  
 
If the monetary crisis of November 1967 had not broken and Britain had persisted 
with the scheme it would have made even less sense. While China may have seemed a 
threat in the mid-1960s, by 1971 a Sino-American rapprochement was underway. 
Indonesia also ceased to be a source of danger after 1966, when a pro-American military 
regime consolidated its hold on power and called off the confrontation with Malaysia. 
Another important long-term trend was the change in the whole basis of British influence 
in the world. Britain, Trend argued in 1964, had maintained ‘a degree of power and 
influence throughout the world which has been greater than our relative military and 
economic strength actually justify; and the mere fact of our military presence in several 
of the key areas of the world has made some contribution, however unquantifiable it may 
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be, to this achievement.’62 But by early 1968, this calculation had changed dramatically. 
After the devaluation, it was a non-military strategy of promoting commercial influence, 
aid policy, educational programmes, and cultural exchange that British ministers saw as 
the means by which to operate. To this Trend now saw ‘no realistic alternative’.63 It was a 
strategy in which a Polaris deployment East of Suez, which the Cabinet Secretary had 
supported for some time, could have no logical place. 
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